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The Bundesverfassungsgericht on the Lisbon Treaty and Why the European 
Union Is Not a State: Some Critical Remarks 
 
By Tobias Lock* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The article will focus on remarks made in the German Federal Constitutional 
Court’s (Bundesverfassungsgericht) decision on the Lisbon Treaty regarding 
the differences between national and international (or rather supranational) 
law and structure.1  While holding the Lisbon Treaty2 to be compatible with the 
German Constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG), the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht explored, amongst other issues, whether the 
European Union had attained statehood and whether the European Union’s 
democratic standards were in accordance with the Basic Law’s requirements.  
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s remarks on these two questions reveal its 
conception of the differences between the state and supranational 
organizations.  The aim of this article is twofold: it tries to explain the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s reasoning, while at the same time critically 
assessing it and highlighting some peculiarities.  The article is divided into two 
parts.  The first part deals with the question of the member states’ and the 
European Union’s statehood, i.e., the question of sovereignty and 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz.  I will argue that the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s 
formalistic approach to sovereignty as an absolute concept is worth re-
considering when discussing the relationship between member states and the 
European Union.  The second part is concerned with the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s views on the European Union’s democratic 
deficit, which it regards as tolerable precisely because the European Union is 
not a state.  This surprising argument will be the basis of a critical evaluation 
of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s implicit denial of the European 
Parliament’s importance and the claim that there is no European people. 
 
SOVEREIGNTY: KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ ÜBER ALLES!? 
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Understanding of Sovereignty 
 
The first point to be addressed is that of sovereignty or Kompetenz-
Kompetenz.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s view of sovereignty is based on 
                                            
*  DAAD/Clifford Chance lecturer at the Faculty of Laws, University College London.; I 
would like to thank my colleague Dr Myriam Hunter-Henin for her valuable comments on a 
draft of this paper.  All errors remain, of course, my own. 
1  Bundesverfassungsgericht (Second Senate), Cases 2 BvE 2/08; 2 BvE 5/08; 2 BvR 
1010/08; 2 BvR 1022/08; 2 BvR 1259/08; 2 BvR 182/09, decision of 30 June 2009 (this article 
refers to the preliminary English translation provided by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which 
can be accessed at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html). 
2  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 Dec. 2007, OJ [2007] C 306/1, 17.12.2007. 
Europe’s ‘statist’ tradition, according to which sovereignty is indivisible.3  It will 
be demonstrated that the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s black and white 
approach, whereby an entity either enjoys Kompetenz-Kompetenz and is thus 
a State, or it does not and is therefore not a State, is not adequate.  The 
division of competences (and Kompetenz-Kompetenz) between the European 
Union and the member states is too complex to be portrayed in such a simple 
manner.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s remarks in this respect are to be 
understood in the light of the Basic Law’s limits to the transfer of competences 
on the European Union.  Such a transfer must not lead to Germany losing its 
statehood.  Article 23 (1) GG, which provides the legal basis for German 
integration in the European Union 4 , expressly states that any Act of 
Parliament ratifying a treaty amending the treaty foundations of the European 
Union is subject to the Basic Law’s ‘eternity guarantee clause’ Article 79 (3) 
GG.  That article outlaws amendments to the Basic Law which affect the 
principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 GG (and thus guarantees their 
eternity).  The latter article expressly refers to Germany as a state, which 
means that the statehood of Germany must not be given up.  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht phrased it as follows:5   
 
The Basic Law does not grant the bodies acting on behalf of Germany powers to 
abandon the right to self-determination of the German people in the form of Germany’s 
sovereignty under international law by joining a federal state. 
 
Therefore, the Bundesverfassungsgericht entered into a lengthy discussion as 
to whether with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the European Union 
were to become a State, and whether Germany would lose its statehood as a 
consequence.  In its assessment, the Bundesverfassungsgericht follows the 
traditional definition of statehood first articulated by Georg Jellinek6 in his so-
called three elements theory (Dreielementelehre), according to which a State 
exists when three conditions are satisfied: a territory, a people and 
sovereignty.7  The focus of my discussion will be on the latter element. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s line of argument whether Germany would 
lose its sovereignty by ratifying the Lisbon Treaty does not differ from that of 
the Maastricht decision.8  According to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, a state 
is sovereign when it has the Kompetenz-Kompetenz, i.e., the competence to 
determine its own competences.  The Basic Law prohibits the transfer of that 
                                            
3  On this and the more flexible American tradition, cf. R. Schütze ‘On “Federal” Ground: 
The European Union As an (Inter)national Phenomenon’ 46 Common Market Law Review 
(2009) p. 1069. 
4  When referring to the European Union, this article means the European Union after 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
5  Bundesverfassungsgericht (Second Senate), Cases 2 BvE 2/08; 2 BvE 5/08; 2 BvR 
1010/08; 2 BvR 1022/08; 2 BvR 1259/08; 2 BvR 182/09, decision of 30 June 2009, para 228; 
this article refers to the preliminary English translation provided by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, which can be accessed at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html 
(visited 15 September 2009). 
6  G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd edn. (Springer, Berlin 1922) p. 183: ‘Als 
Rechtsbegriff ist der Staat demnach als die mit ursprünglicher Herrschaftsmacht ausgerüstete 
Körperschaft eines seßhaften Volkes’. 
7  A similar definition can be found in Art. 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention, 165 
LNTS 19. 
8  BVerfGE 89, 155; the English translation can be found at: [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57. 
competence on the European Union.9  The member states must therefore 
remain ‘masters of the Treaties’.10  The European Union can thus only enjoy 
competences derived from those of the member states.11  Thus the principle 
of conferred powers, i. e. the principle that the European Union may only act 
where it has been given the power to do so, is not only a principle of 
European law but also warranted by the Basic Law.12  The member states as 
sovereign states must remain the source of all the competences enjoyed by 
the European Union.  They must be able to revoke the competences at any 
time.   
In the Lisbon decision, the Bundesverfassungsgericht was faced with the 
question whether, measured by these strict standards, the Lisbon Treaty was 
a step too far.  I want to critically examine two points that the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht addressed while concluding that the European 
Union does not enjoy any Kompetenz-Kompetenz:  amendments to the 
Treaties and the significance of the right to withdraw from the European Union.  
Finally, I want to point to the fact that the Bundesverfassungsgericht seems to 
have overlooked a Treaty provision codifying the European Court of Justice’s 
implied powers doctrine regarding the European Union’s external 
competences.   
 
Treaty Amendments and Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, amendments to the Treaties will generally still 
require the conclusion and ratification of an amending treaty by all member 
states. 13   Despite certain procedural peculiarities, this provision therefore 
reflects the situation under public international law.  However, the Lisbon 
Treaty introduces two simplified revision procedures and extends the scope of 
the present Article 308 EC, the future Article 352 TFEU.  All of these provide 
for amendments of the Treaties, without requiring the conclusion of an 
amending treaty.  Therefore, the Bundesverfassungsgericht had to discuss 
whether these provisions conferred Kompetenz-Kompetenz on the European 
Union.   
Regarding the simplified revision procedure outlined in Artice 48 (6) TEU 
(Lisbon), the Bundesverfassungsgericht came to the conclusion that the 
Treaty did not endow the European Union with Kompetenz-Kompetenz as that 
article expressly states that it cannot increase the European Union’s 
competences.14  Nonetheless, procedurally this provision is a hybrid and a 
step away from classic public international law.  It still contains the 
requirement that the member states (and not only the European Union’s 
institutions) approve the amendment.  At the same time, however, it no longer 
requires the conclusion of an amending treaty but rather declares a wholly 
internal procedure to be sufficient.  The latter clearly reminds us of the 
amendment procedures of a domestic constitution and the provision can 
                                            
9  BVerfG, n 5 supra, para 233; BVerfGE 89, 155 (187-188). 
10  BVerfG, n 5 supra, para 231. 
11  BVerfG, n 5 supra, para 231. 
12  BVerfG, n 5 supra, para 234; the principle can be found in the present Art 5 (1) EC 
and in Art 5 TEU (Lisbon). 
13  Art. 48 (2) TEU (Lisbon).  
14  BVerfG, n 5 supra, para 314. 
therefore be seen as a state-like element in the TEU.  Substantively, Art. 48 (6) 
TEU (Lisbon) applies to all provisions contained in Part III of the TFEU 
(Lisbon), i.e., provisions that lie at the very heart of European Union primary 
law, such as those on the Common Market.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
however, did not have any problems finding this provision to be in accordance 
with the Basic Law as the provision expressly requires the approval of the 
member states in accordance with their constitutional requirements.  
Therefore, from the point of view of the Basic Law, the member states’ 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz is preserved since each member state has to 
expressly approve of an amendment. 
The other provision dealing with a simplified revision of the Treaties is Art. 48 
(7) TEU (Lisbon), which goes a good deal further.  According to that article, 
the Council and the European Parliament can change the majority required for 
certain decisions from unanimity to a qualified majority, unless a national 
Parliament opposes that extension of qualified majority voting.  In contrast to 
Article 48 (6) TEU (Lisbon), the consent of all the member states is not 
required, making the procedure even more state-like and only granting 
national parliaments a right to veto.  It is, therefore, a wholly internal 
amendment procedure such as can be found in domestic constitutions.  
Substantively, the introduction of a qualified majority leads to a reduction in 
powers of the individual member state, as it can no longer block decisions 
taken in accordance with the amended procedure. 15   Therefore, the 
introduction of Article 48 (7) must be regarded as conferring on the European 
Union the power to decide upon the scope of some of its own competences 
without the prior consent of the member states.  While the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht did not chose to expressly acknowledge that 
Article 48 (7) TEU (Lisbon) confers some Kompetenz-Kompetenz on the 
European Union, it nonetheless reacted and required that the German 
representative in the Council may only approve of such a Treaty amendment 
after the German parliament has adopted an Act of Parliament sanctioning the 
amendment.16   
Even more obviously, the European Union enjoys Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
with regard to the new Article 352 TFEU (Lisbon), which extends the scope of 
present Article 308 EC, to all policy areas.  According to that provision, the 
European Union can act even in fields for which it has no competence, where 
action is necessary for the attainment of one of the objectices set out in the 
Treaty.  Procedurally, Article 352 TFEU (Lisbon) provides for a decision by the 
Council and the European Parliament but does not require that the member 
states approve in accordance with their constitutions.17  Thus the procedure is 
again a wholly internal procedure for the European Union.  Moreover 
substantively, Article 352 TFEU (Lisbon) will enable the European Union to 
extend its own competences quite considerably. 18   The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht expressly stated that Article 352 TFEU (Lisbon) 
                                            
15  BVerfG, n 5 supra, para 317. 
16  BVerfG, n 5 supra, para. 319; that act of parliament would have to satisfy the 
requirements for amendments of the EU Treaties set out by Art. 23 GG. 
17  BVerfG, n 5 supra, para 327. 
18  The current Art. 308 EC has been used as a basis for competence in a number of 
cases and has generally been interpreted widely, cf. Paul Craig and Grainne de Búrca EU 
Law (4th edn, Oxford 2007), 93-95. 
could lead to a Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the European Union and therefore 
found a similar solution as regards Article 48 (7) TEU (Lisbon).19  The German 
representative must not approve of a proposed piece of legislation unless the 
German parliament has given its prior approval. 
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s reasoning and its solutions warrant a few 
comments.  In sanctioning the procedures above, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht relied on a rather formal notion of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz and thus of sovereignty.  It regards Germany to be sovereign as it 
(together with the other member states) still has the formal right to decide 
upon the extension of the European Union’s competences.  Ultimately the 
member states, at least in theory, have the right to dissolve the European 
Union at any time they want.20  This rather formal approach works well when 
dealing with the ordinary amendment procedure and also when looking at 
Article 48 (6) TEU (Lisbon), which expressly states that it cannot lead to an 
increase in European Union competences and requires the member states’ 
consent.  Even when we look at Article 48 (7) TEU (Lisbon), where the 
European Union can clearly extend its competences, this approach could 
have still been employed: The extension of competences is limited to changes 
in the majority needed for decisions at internal level.  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht could therefore have argued that a national 
Parliament ratifying the Treaty can foresee the amendments and therefore 
this further transfer of competences on the European Union is covered by the 
ratifying act.  Nonetheless, the Bundesverfassungsgericht itself must have 
obviously regarded that provision as laying down a Kompetenz-Kompetenz for 
the European Union.  Otherwise it would not have required a national 
approval of the use of Article 48 (7) on a case-by-case basis.   
 
With regard to Article 352 TFEU (Lisbon), where the extension of the 
European Union’s competences is not at all foreseeable, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht also realized that the European Union was given a 
certain degree of Kompetenz-Kompetenz.  Therefore, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht had to choose: Either it could declare the Lisbon 
Treaty to be incompatible with the Basic Law, which would have created a 
major political crisis, or it could introduce a hurdle at national level in order to 
prevent the erosion of national competences.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
followed the latter path.  Therefore, the Bundesverfassungsgericht required 
that the German parliament decide in accordance with the procedural 
requirements for the ratification of amendments to the European Union 
Treaties, before the German representative in the Council may vote for the 
extension of competences.  From the point of view of German constitutional 
law, the introduction of such a clearance procedure is sufficient: It ensures the 
participation of the German parliament when it comes to the extension of 
European Union competences and thus ensures that the transfer of 
competences is sufficiently legitimized.  Incidentally it also gives the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht an opportunity to review the constitutionality of 
each of these parliamentary decisions.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
                                            
19  BVerfG, n 5 supra, para 328. 
20  BVerfGE 89, 155 (190); BVerfG, n 5 supra, para 233.  
explicitly terms this type of review ‘identity review’ (Identitätskontrolle).  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht employs this new term because it will have to 
judge whether an Act of Parliament sanctioning the extension of the 
Community’s competences surrenders Germany’s identity as a state.21 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s reasoning is, however, not sufficient to 
distract us from the fact that under the Treaties the European Union has 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, albeit in certain limited areas.  In addition, member 
states can no longer unilaterally exercise some of their powers to the 
detriment of the European Union and have thus lost their Kompetenz-
Kompetenz in this respect as well.22 
This leads to a rather paradoxical situation: on the one hand, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht inisists that Germany must not agree to the 
European Union attaining Kompetenz-Kompetenz and thus a degree of 
statehood.  On the other hand, the judges clearly sanction the inclusion of 
provisions granting Kompetenz-Kompetenz to the European Union while 
being satisfied with the erection of national hurdles, which will bind the 
German representative in the Council.23  This shows that, at least with regard 
to the European Union, sovereignty is a relative concept.  Both the member 
states and the European Union enjoy Kompetenz-Kompetenz in certain 
fields.24  As Möllers has already pointed out with regard to the failed European 
Constitution, the dichotomy of dependence and autonomy is not a workable 
concept for explaining the relationship between the European Union and 
national legal systems.25  It would have been more honest and preferable if 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht had expressly recognized that legal situation.26  
Such recognition of a limited sovereignty of the European Union would not 
have been a novelty but would have been in the American federalist 
tradition.27  Instead the Bundesverfassungsgericht chose to cling to its black 
and white approach and got tangled up in it.  However, had the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht acknowledged that the European Union will now 
enjoy a certain degree of sovereignty, it would have either had to declare the 
Lisbon Treaty incompatible with the Basic Law or it would have had to give up 
its long-standing jurisprudence according to which Germany must not grant 
any Kompetenz-Kompetenz to the European Union.  I suggest that the latter 
                                            
21  BVerfG, n 5 supra, para 240. 
22  A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast ‘The European Union’s Vertical Order Of Competences: 
The Current Law and Proposals For Its Reform’ 39 Common Market Law Review (2002), 
p 227 at p. 237;  Schütze n 3, p. 1083. 
23  On similar procedures in other Member States cf. P. Kiiver ‘German Participation in 
EU Decision-Making after the Lisbon Case: A Comparative View on Domestic Parliamentary 
Clearance Procedures’ 10 German Law Journal (2009) p 1287. 
24  J. A. Frowein ‘Das Maastricht-Urteil und die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit’ 
54 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1994) p. 1 at p. 7. 
25  C. Möllers ‘Pouvoir Constituant-Constitution-Constitutionalisation’ in A. von Bogdandy 
and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart, Oxford 2005), p. 184 at 
p. 201; in a similar manner Herdegen questions with regard to the Maastricht decision 
whether the BVerfG’s approach is suitable, cf. M. Herdegen ‘Maastricht and the German 
Constitutional Court: Constitutional Restraints For an “Ever Closer Union”’ 31 Common 
Market Law Review (1994) p. 235 at p. 242-244. 
26  Interestingly, Udo di Fabio, the reporting judge in the Lisbon decision, conceded in 
1993 already that the EU enjoyed a factual Kompetenz-Kompetenz, cf. U. di Fabio, ‘Der neue 
Art. 23 des Grundgesetzes’ 13 Der Staat (1993), p. 191 at p. 197. 
27  Schütze n 33 supra, p 1077 et seq. 
should have been considered.  There is nothing in the wording of the Basic 
Law that suggests that the European Union must not enjoy a limited degree of 
sovereignty while at the same time Germany retaining its status as a state.  
Moreover, such a solution would be in accordance with the Basic Law’s 
openness towards European law (Europarechtsfreundlichkeit) as enshrined in 
Article 23 GG, which the Bundesverfassungsgericht repeatedly emphasizes.28 
 
The significance of the right to withdraw 
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht also grounds its finding that Germany has not 
lost its sovereignty in Article 50 TEU (Lisbon), which explicitly gives member 
states a right to withdraw from the European Union and sets out the 
procedure that needs to be followed.29  At first glance at least, this provision 
shows that there is a crucial difference between the European Union and 
federal states.  The constitutions of the latter do not allow their constituent 
states to withdraw from the federation.  Under international law such a 
withdrawal would have to be regarded as an illegal secession.30  Therefore, 
the explicit right to withdraw from the European Union may well be regarded 
as evidence for the thesis that the European Union is not a State and that the 
member states have not lost their sovereignty.  However, the inclusion of that 
right can equally be regarded as a sign for the growing autonomy of the 
European Union legal order.  As Möllers has pointed out, we must not forget 
that the opportunity to withdraw is granted by virtue of Article 50 TEU (Lisbon), 
i.e., by European law itself.  Equally, the conditions for a lawful withdrawal are 
spelt out by the TEU and not by domestic constitutional or by international law.  
Therefore the Article draws the line between a lawful withdrawal (i.e., in 
accordance with Article 50) and an illegal withdrawal. 31   Thus the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s simple reference to Article 50 TEU (Lisbon) is not 
in itself a convincing argument for the member states’ sovereignty.   
 
No mention of the codification of the implied powers doctrine 
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s decision warrants one last remark as 
regards the issue of sovereignty.  The judges leave unmentioned the fact that 
Articles 3 (2) and 216 TFEU (Lisbon) contain a codification of the European 
Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on the European Union’s implied powers in 
external relations.32  Article 3 (2) TFEU (Lisbon) is phrased in a rather vague 
manner, stating that the ‘Union shall have exclusive competence for the 
conclusion of an international agreement, when its conclusion is provided for 
in a legislative act of the Union, or is necessary to enable the Union to 
exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect 
                                            
28  BVerfG, n 5 supra, paras 225, 240, 241 and 340. 
29  BVerfG, n 5 supra, paras 225, 240, 241 and 340. 
30  An ethnic minority’s right to self-determination does generally not amount to a right to 
secession outside the context of decolonization.  On the discussion in international law cf. S. 
Mancini ‘Rethinking the boundaries of democratic secession: liberalism, nationalism, and the 
right of minorities to self-determination’ International Journal of Constitutional Law [2008] 
p. 553. 
31  C. Möllers, n 25, at p. 201-202. 
32  So-called parallelism, first introduced by the ECJ in Case 22/70, Commission v 
Council [1971] ECR 263 (AETR). 
common rules or alter their scope’.  Art. 216 (1) has a similar wording.  The 
exact extent of these provisions and thus of the European Union’s 
competences in external relations, is hard to foresee.33  It will therefore be for 
the European Union itself to decide when it has an external competence and 
the only body which has jurisdiction to review such a decision is the European 
Court of Justice, which again is an European Union institution.  Thus the 
provision clearly gives the European Union a right to establish its own external 
competence by passing a legislative act providing for such a competence.  
Therefore, Article 3 (2) TFEU is another provision giving the European Union 
some degree of Kompetenz-Kompetenz for external action.  Why this 
provision escaped the scrutiny of the Bundesverfassungsgericht is not clear 
but striking.   
 
 
IS THE EUROPEAN UNION DEMOCRATIC BECAUSE IT IS NOT A STATE? 
 
Apart from the question of whether the member states still enjoy sovereignty 
and therefore statehood, the Bundesverfassungsgericht explored whether the 
European Union is in compliance with the democratic requirements of the 
Basic Law.34  The Bundesverfassungsgericht came to the conclusion that the 
European Union exactly complies with these requirements because it is not a 
state and its structure is not laid out in analogy to a state.35  Article 23 GG is 
the provision in the Basic Law which enables the legislature to transfer 
competences on the European Union.  Such a transfer, however, is limited by 
the ‘eternity guarantee clause’ of Article 79 (3) GG, which provides that the 
principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 GG must not be affected.  Article 20 
(1) GG contains the principle of democracy so that a transfer of competences 
can only take place where the principle of democracy is respected.  Thus it 
was for the Bundesverfassungsgericht to ascertain that the European Union 
complies with democratic standards.36  Given the background of the much-
discussed democratic deficit at European Union level, 37  this assessment 
proved to be of particular interest as it led to interesting remarks about the 
differences in structure between a federal state and the European Union.  
Whether these differences justify the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s reasoning 
regarding democracy is however doubtful.  I will therefore first outline the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s argument and then show that it contains certain 
flaws.   
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s line of argument 
 
First, the Bundesverfassungsgericht pointed out that the Basic Law allows for 
the European Union to adopt a different model of democracy than the Basic 
                                            
33  On the scope of this provision cf. M. Cremona, ‘Defining competence in EU external 
relations: lessons from the Treaty reform process’, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), 
Law and Practice of EU External Relations (CUP, Cambridge 2008) p. 34, at p. 61-63. 
34  Art. 20 GG requires that Germany be a democratic state.  
35  BVerfG, n 5 supra, para 278. 
36  BVerfG, n 5 supra, para 244. 
37  Cf. D. Chalmers and A. Tomkins European Union Public Law (CUP, Cambridge 
2007), p. 167-177. 
Law’s due to the requirements of a European Union that is based on the 
equality of states and that has been negotiated under international law.38  This 
is possible because the Basic Law is generally open towards international law.  
This openness, however, cannot affect the German people’s right to self-
determination, which is the basis for Germany’s sovereignty.39 
For the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the crucial point seems to be that the 
principle of conferred powers is preserved.  As long as that is the case, the 
democratic legitimation provided by national parliaments and governments, 
which is complemented by the European Parliament, is sufficient.40  However, 
as soon as the threshold to a federal state has been crossed, the European 
Union would have to comply with the democratic requirements of a state.41  
This would be the case if the European Union had become an entity that 
corresponded to the federal level in a federal state. 42   The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, however, was quick to point out that the European 
Union only exercised derived powers and therefore need not fully comply with 
the same democratic requirements as a member state. 43   The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht rather concluded that precisely because the 
European Union is not laid out in analogy to a state, it complied with the 
democratic requirements for supranational organizations set by the Basic 
Law. 44   The judges mainly looked at the composition of the European 
Parliament in order to prove that the structure of the European Union is 
different to that of a State.  Even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
members of the European Parliament will be elected according to national 
quotas.  According to Article 14 (2) TEU (Lisbon), each Member State shall be 
allocated a minimum of six seats but no more than 96 seats.  This can lead to 
a considerable difference in the number of people represented by one 
member depending on the member state. The composition of the European 
Parliament will still be greatly influenced by the international legal principle of 
sovereign equality of states.45  While each member state’s quota is based on 
the size of its population the quotas still do not reflect the real differences in 
size.46  Therefore, the question had to be answered, whether the democratic 
principle of ‘one man, one vote’ is infringed.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
held that the rule only applied within a people and consequently went on to 
explain that there is no single European people.  With view of these national 
quotas, the Bundesverfassungsgericht speaks of an ‘excessive federalization’ 
of the European Union. 47   Not only is the composition of the European 
Parliament determined by state quotas, but also the composition of the 
Council, the Commission and the Court of Justice.48  In this context, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht mentions that the European Union’s model of 
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democracy is deficient if measured by the standards that would apply within 
states.49   However, since the European Union is not measured by these 
standards, the Lisbon Treaty does not violate the Basic Law’s requirement 
that the European Union be democratic.  
 
Some critical remarks 
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s argument warrants some remarks.  While I 
do not wish to dismiss the concerns regarding the European Union’s 
democratic deficit, I would like to point to some inconsistencies and 
peculiarities in the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s argument, specifically 
regarding the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s understanding of the state as 
opposed to the European Union.   
 
The first point to be made is of a more general nature and addresses the 
question of why the Bundesverfassungsgericht chose to address the problem 
of the democratic deficit in the way it did.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
came to the conclusion that if the European Union were a state, its standard 
of democratization would not be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the 
Basic Law.  But since the European Union is not a state, its democratic 
standards are sufficient.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht discussed this point 
after it had explicitly stated that under the Basic Law the European Union 
cannot become a state, as this would automatically deprive Germany of its 
statehood, which is not possible under the ‘eternity guarantee clause’ of 
Article 79 (3) GG.  It therefore seems that the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s 
discussion of this question was wholly unnecessary, unless it was the its aim 
to criticize the state of the democracy in the European Union in general.  The 
argument can therefore only be understood as a general warning issued to 
the member states for the negotiation of future amending treaties.   
Furthermore, the denial of the existence of a European people is quite 
remarkable in this respect since Article 9 (1) TEU (Lisbon) expressly mentions 
the ‘citizen[s] of the Union’, Article 10 (2) TEU (Lisbon) states that these Union 
citizens are represented in the European Parliament and Article 14 (2) TEU 
(Lisbon) reaffirms that the ‘European Parliament shall be composed of 
representatives of the Union’s citizens’.  Up until now, Article 189 EC 
stipulated that the European Parliament consisted of a representation of the 
‘peoples of the States’.  Thus the aforementioned articles were clearly 
designed to change that and create a European people.  Both provisions 
therefore clearly suggest that there is a European people.  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, however, was adamant that a European people 
did not exist and pointed out that representation in the European Parliament 
was linked to nationality and not to the equality of the citizens of the Union.50  
This, however, is not true: As Halberstam and Möllers have correctly pointed 
out, an Italian citizen who lives in Lithuania votes for the Lithuanian contingent 
in the European Parliament.51  Therefore, when determining where a Union 
citizen casts their vote in a European election and thus by which national 
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quota of members of the European Parliament this citizen will be represented, 
the decisive factor is residence and not nationality.  Thus there is 
considerable doubt whether the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s argument 
against the existence of a European people is convincing.   
Another surprising point in this context is that the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
attaches only very little importance to the European Parliament as an 
institution of the European Union.  The foremost reason why it considers 
European Union legislation and decision-making to be democratically 
legitimate is because the member states’ representatives in the Council have 
been legitimized by national parliaments.52  The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
therefore considers that the European Union’s structure, if measured against 
the principle of representative democracy, shows ‘excessive federalisation’ 
(erhebliche Überföderalisierung).53  The rationale behind this is clearly that the 
European Parliament is still elected in national quotas.  However, what exactly 
constitutes an excessive federalisation as opposed to ‘regular’ federalisation 
remains unclear.  This is not surprising when one considers that measured by 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s standards existing federal systems would 
suffer from the same defect.  The constitution of the United States, for 
instance, provides that each state shall have at least one Representative in 
the House of Representatives, which leads to the citizens of Vermont or 
Wyoming to be overrepresented.54  This is even more evident when we look a 
the United States Senate, which consists of two senators per state, 
independent of the state’s population.  It can hardly be doubted, however, that 
the United States is a federal democracy.   
Given the actual legal status of the European Parliament it is surprising that 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht only considers it to be an ‘additional 
independent source of democratic legitimisation’. 55   The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht therefore only regards the European Parliament as 
fulfilling a complementary role, as the European Union is legitimized through 
its member states and not directly through the people.  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht explicitly equated it with second chambers of 
national parliaments, which are said to be characterized by imbalances in 
representation.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht therefore does not regard the 
European Parliament to be a necessary institution when it comes to the 
question of democratic legitimation.  This factual denial of the European 
Parliament’s importance is significant considering that its influence will grow 
even after the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force.  The present co-decision 
procedure, which will become known as the ordinary legislative procedure, 
has been extended.56  This means that the European Parliament’s assent will 
be necessary for most pieces of Union legislation.  It will therefore become as 
important as the Council in the ordinary European legislative process.  To 
reduce the role of the European Parliament to merely complementing the 
Council’s democratic legitimation denies its actual importance and is only 
accurate where another legislative procedure is followed.   
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The Bundesverfassungsgericht seems to attach considerable importance to 
the fact that the European Union only exercises powers that are derived from 
the member states.  This seems to have influenced the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s leniency with regard to the democratic standards 
with which the European Union must comply. 57  The argument seems to be 
rooted in the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s denial of the European Union’s 
sovereignty and thus the possibility of the European Union exercising powers 
in its own right as the European Union is not a State.  It has been argued 
above that the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s black and white approach towards 
sovereigny is not suited to the European Union.  It should not make a 
difference for the question democratic legitimacy whether the European Union 
enjoys its powers thanks to the member states’ sovereignty or as a result of 
its own sovereignty.  For this reason alone, the decision between original and 
derived powers is not convincing.  It is interesting to note that at another place 
in the decision, the Bundesverfassungsgericht draws a comparison between 
the European Union’s derived autonomy and that of local self-government.58  
However, it is hardly conceivable that the Bundesverfassungsgericht would 
accept the democratic deficits described by it at local level.  Article 28 (1) GG, 
which deals with local government, explicitly provides that local government 
must be democratic and that it must be based on the principle of equal 
elections.  Therefore, the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s comparison with local 
government does not scan.  Merely pointing at the fact the European Union’s 
powers are derived from those of the member states is therefore not a 
sufficient justification for different democratic standards.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Why did the Bundesverfassungsgericht reason thus?  I suggest that the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht had to avoid stepping into the traps it had laid itself.  
As has been shown above, the European Union enjoys limited sovereignty in 
various fields and the Bundesverfassungsgericht, at least implicitly, admits 
that.   
As mentioned above, the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s doctrine as regards the 
transfer of competences onto the European Union is based on the premise 
that Germany must not give up its own statehood. 59   The problem the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht faces is that it equates the relinquishing of 
statehood with the transfer of sovereignty (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).  Even 
though it could be argued that the European Union has gained some degree 
sovereignty, the Bundesverfassungsgericht had to deny that fact in order to 
be able to declare the Lisbon Treaty constitutional.  Nonetheless, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht was obviously not satisfied with such an outcome.  
This is why it introduced the requirement for a national clearing procedure in 
cases of a transfer of further competences on the European Union. And for 
the same reason the Bundesverfassungsgericht felt the need to dedicate 
seven paragraphs of its judgment to an argument why the European Union’s 
democratic standards would not be satisfactory if the European Union were a 
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state.60  These remarks can therefore only be understood as a warning:  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht made it clear that it would not tolerate a further 
transfer of competences onto the European Union should the democratic 
deficit not be removed.   
The Lisbon decision shows that the Bundesverfassungsgericht had to struggle 
to reconcile an increasingly state-like European Union with the requirements 
of the Basic Law, the most important requirement being the preservation of 
Germany’s statehood.  Despite the criticism of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s reasoning, its concerns about the state of 
democracy in the European Union should not be disregarded.  It is 
dissatisfying for Union citizens from large member states that their vote in a 
European election carries less weight than that of a Union citizen living in a 
smaller member state.  Equally, the Bundesverfassungsgericht is correct in 
pointing out that democracy needs a viable public opinion, which at present 
does not exist due to the lack of a European public.61  In order to show that 
the Lisbon Treaty nonetheless satisfied the requirements of the Basic Law, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht chose to point out the differences between the 
Europen Union and a sovereign state.  In doing so, it was obviously the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s intent to uphold the Lisbon Treaty.  Yet the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht equally did not want to compromise on the 
requirements for democratic standards and the strict definition of sovereignty.  
This explains why parts of the decision appear contradictory.   
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